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| IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
V . 
KELLY TYSON DAVIS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20090934 
INTRODUCTION 
KELLY TYSON DAVIS, by and through his attorney of record contends that he 
has made a valid claim which may be addressed by this Court under the plain error 
standard. He also responds to the State's assertions of ineffective assistance of counsel. 
ARGUMENT 
L INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WAS PROPERLY 
PRESERVED BY DEFENDANT'S PRO SE MOTION 
A. A Defendant May Properly File a Pro Se Motion Alleging Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel 
The State contends that an "ex parte communication from a represented 
defendant" cannot constitute a motion for new trial, and as authority for this proposition, 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
it cites State v. Wareham, 2006 UT App 327, 143 P.3d 302. Wareham explicitly prohibits 
a defendant from "hybrid representation" in which retains counsel, but remains at liberty 
to file his own motions. Id. at ^ 33. However, this Court stated that claims of ineffective 
assistance do not fall under this rule. Id. See also, People v. Serio, 830 N.E.2d 749 (111. 
App. Ct. 2005) (cited by this Court as persuasive authority in Wareham). 
Defendant specifically claimed ineffective assistance of counsel in his motion filed 
a little over a week after sentencing. He stated that "only reason I had plead [sic] guilty in 
the first place is that I was lead [sic] to believe by Mr. Ryan Bushell and the prosecuter 
[sic] that by pleading guilty it would run concurrent with the one year sentence I was 
already serving here in the Davis County jail." (R. 32.) 
Defendant's motion alleged that his attorney misled him about the nature of the 
plea deal. He clearly expresses dissatisfaction with his counsel, which should be 
construed as a motion alleging his counsel was ineffective. 
Contrary to the State's assertions, courts have frequently considered matters 
preserved when filed by defendants pro se, even when represented. See, United States v. 
Partee, 273 Fed. Appx. 529, 531 (7th Cir. 2008) ("There is a significant question whether 
this issue was preserved for appeal. Partee raised it in a pro se motion during the time he 
was represented by counsel. Nevertheless, we will proceed as if it were preserved."); 
United States v. Landham, 251 F.3d 1072, 1079 (6th Cir. 2001) ("Given the liberality with 
which we construe pro se pleadings, we hold this issue was preserved, and we now 
2 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
address it."); United States v. Simpson, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3351, 16 (N.D. 111. 1997) 
("[H]is pro se motion preserved his ineffective assistance of counsel claim for direct 
appeal where Simpson was represented by different counsel."); Beard v. State, 627 So.2d 
1122, 1123 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) ("Contrary to the argument of the attorney general, 
this issue was preserved for our review by the appellant's pro se motion for new trial 
alleging that he was 'denied due process of law' by the 'lack of evidence.'"); Norman v. 
State, 764 So. 2d 738 (Fla. App. 2000) ("He preserved these issues by filing a pro se 
motion in the trial court..."); State v. Tedder, 404 N.E.2d 437, 444 (111. App. 1980) 
("Defendants' next issue, preserved in Tedder's pro se motion for a new trial . . ."); Cross 
v. Commonwealth, 2007 Ky. App. LEXIS 117, 9 (Ky. App. 2007) ("As to whether Cross 
received a speedy trial, we hold that Cross preserved that issue when he filed his pro se 
motion."); Hohenstreet v. State, 784 S.W.2d 868, 869 (Mo. App. 1990) ("Our review, 
therefore, shall be limited to those issues preserved in movant's original pro se motion."); 
State v. Haas, 750 N.W.2d 518 (Wis. App. 2008) ("Haas raised this issue before the trial 
in his pro se motion. Accordingly, the issue has been preserved for review."). 
Several policy reasons justify allowing a pro se motion in limited circumstances. 
First, defendants who have been prejudiced by the ineffective representation of their 
attorneys should be allowed to petition the court to redress their wrongs. One concern is 
that the court will be flooded with pro se motions. Courts routinely deal with such 
motions and more often than not, summarily dispose of them. See State v. Vessey, 967 
P.2d 960, 961 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (Defendant filed a pro se motion alleging his counsel 
3 
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failed to investigate issues for him. Ineffective assistance addressed on appeal.); State v. 
Scales, 946 P.2d 377, 380 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (Defendant filed two pro se motions 
expressing dissatisfaction with his counsel which were denied by the trial court. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel addressed on appeal.). But when a person raises a valid 
issue which his counsel refuses to raise, the very essence of ineffective assistance is 
raised and the court has an obligation to address the issue. See State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 
960 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (discussion supra). Additionally, beyond ineffective assistance, 
the motion may very well raise an issue of plain error to the court, which may highlight 
an issue the court itself has an obligation to address. 
B. Defense Counsel's Failure to Object to the Prosecutor's Breach 
Constituted Ineffective Assistance of Counsel 
The State responds to defendant's plain error argument1 with a response as to 
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant responds accordingly to the State's argument 
about ineffective assistance. Defendant asserts that this Court may alternatively find that 
his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to the prosecutor's plain breach of the 
plea agreement. 
An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the first time on appeal 
presents a question of law. To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant 
Defendant's opening brief mentioned that he could meet "both showings" of plain error 
and ineffective assistance of counsel, yet he did not brief ineffective assistance. Aplt's Br. 
at 11-12. Because the State raised this issue in its reply, defendant will fully address it in 
his reply. 
4 
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must show: (1) that counsel's performance was objectively deficient and (2) a 
reasonable probability exists that but for the deficient conduct defendant would 
have obtained a more favorable outcome at trial. To satisfy the first part of the test, 
defendant must overcome the strong presumption that [his] trial counsel rendered 
adequate assistance. 
State v. Ott, 2010 UT 1,122, 647 Utah Adv. Rep. 19 (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
The Ott case is particularly instructive. In that case, defense counsel failed to 
object to victim impact testimony which was presented at his sentencing hearing. The 
testimony surrounded the victims' feelings if Ott were to be released and their opinions as 
to his ability to be rehabilitated. Id at ^[26-32. The Supreme Court found these 
statements to be highly prejudicial and inadmissible in a sentencing hearing. Id at f 33. 
Counsel's failure to object to the admission of these statements constituted ineffective 
assistance of counsel, partially because the United States Supreme Court had specifically 
prohibited this kind of testimony. "[I]f the evidence ha[s] no conceivable beneficial value 
to [the defendant], the failure to object to it cannot be excused as trial strategy." Id. at *f 
38, citing State v. Hovater, 914 P.2d 37, 42 (Utah 1996). 
This case is akin to Ott. Defense counsel had arranged a plea bargain with the 
State in which the prosecutor agreed to recommend a concurrent sentence to Mr. Davis's 
jail sentence. A concurrent sentence would involve no additional jail time. Yet when the 
prosecutor changed, mid-sentencing, his recommendation to prison, this constituted a 
clear breach of the agreement. Like Ott, clear United States Supreme Court caselaw 
prohibits prosecutors from breaching their plea agreements. 
5 
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In Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257 (1971), the prosecutor agreed to make 
no recommendation as to the sentence. Id at 258. At sentencing, the prosecutor 
recommended the maximum sentence, which was one-year incarceration. IcL at 259. 
Defense counsel "immediately objected" yet the trial court denied the objection, stating 
that it had the ultimate discretion as to punishment and not the prosecutor. Id The 
Supreme Court said that this was erroneous: 
This phase of the process of criminal justice, and the adjudicative element inherent in 
accepting a plea of guilty, must be attended by safeguards to insure the defendant 
what is reasonably due in the circumstances. Those circumstances will vary, but a 
constant factor is that when a plea rests in any significant degree on a promise or 
agreement of the prosecutor, so that it can be said to be part of the inducement or 
consideration, such promise must be fulfilled. 
Id. at 262 (emphasis added). The Court emphasized that the remedy in these situations is 
to remand the matter to the trial court for resentencing with a different judge, allowing 
the defendant to withdraw the plea or specific performance of the plea agreement. IcL at 
263. The Court clarified that this constituted a prosecutorial fault and not that of the trial 
court. Id. 
Clearly in this case, the defendant entered a guilty plea in order to ensure that he 
was given no additional jail time to that which he had already been sentenced to in Davis 
County. This was the key element of the plea bargain—one which the prosecutor himself 
acknowledged both on the plea agreement and at the sentencing hearing. When the 
prosecutor changed his mind and recommended prison, defense counsel should have 
"immediately objected" like counsel did in Santobello. 
6 
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A failure to object constitutes an objectively deficient performance. There could 
be no reason why trial counsel would want a prison recommendation—especially when 
the entire negotiation process revolved etround the State making a concurrent jail 
recommendation. At the time the plea was entered, defense counsel stated "The State's 
not going to oppose the sentence running concurrent with the year he's serving in Davis 
County Jail." (R. 62:2.) (emphasis added). The prosecutor not only failed to object to this 
statement, he also signed the affidavit which contained the statement that the "State 
agrees sentence may run concurrent with Davis Co. case." (R. 19.) At no other point in 
the plea bargaining process did the prosecution make any qualifying statements as to the 
plea bargain. At sentencing, defense counsel stated that "when [Davis] did plead in—in— 
on this, he—the State recommended concurrent sentencing with Davis County." (R. 63:6-
7.) To this statement, the prosecutor responded, "That's correct, we did recommend that 
it—this run concurrently with Davis County. We didn't agree to recommend that 
whatever their sentence was, it would be the sentence we'd recommend in this case." (R. 
63:7.) 
The State concedes that the prosecutor "agreed to recommend that Defendant's 
sentence run concurrently with the sentence in the Davis County case." Aplnt's Br. at 9. 
But axiomatically, the State contends that it does not constitute a breach of the plea 
agreement to change the recommendation to prison because the "prosecutor did not agree 
to recommend the same sentence as that imposed in the Davis County case." Aplnt's Br. 
at 10. In other words, according to the State, a prosecutor may tell a defendant that he 
7 
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will recommend a concurrent jail sentence and that once a defendant pleads, the 
prosecutor can recommend a concurrent prison sentence. Such a promise is clearly 
misleading and turns on semantics: "I said that I would recommend a concurrent sentence 
to your jail commitment, but I did not say that it would be a jail sentence—it could very 
well be a concurrent prison sentence." Most people would not understand this type of 
semantic explanation. A defendant who is told that the prosecutor would recommend a 
concurrent jail sentence clearly would think the prosecutor would be recommending that 
he serve no more time than the jail commitment he is already serving. 
Additionally, this was not what was stated in the plea agreement. Defense counsel 
stated that the State did not oppose that "the sentence [would] run[] concurrent with the 
year he's serving in Davis County Jail." (R. 62:2.) The State contends that this could 
mean prison because the prosecutor did not agree to give the same sentence as in Davis 
County. This clearly contradicts what was said at the plea agreement when defense 
counsel stated that the State would not oppose the sentence on this case "running 
concurrent with the year he's serving ..." Id. 
This understanding was clearly referenced by the defendant when he filed his 
motion. See R. 32. Yet, significantly, this was the same meaning his counsel took from 
the exchange. The following discussion highlights this issue: 
MR. LAKER: And when he did plead in—in—on this, he—the State 
recommended concurrent sentencing with Davis County. 
8 
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MR. SAUNDERS: That's correct, we did recommend that it—this run 
concurrently with Davis County. We didn't agree to recommend that whatever 
their sentence was, it would be the sentence we'd recommend in this case. 
THE COURT: Right. Okay. 
MR. LAKER: But they did recommend a year and he's serving a year now, 
your Honor, which would be long than, probably actual time would probably serve 
longer than he would if you followed the recommendations and sent him to prison. 
MR. LAKER: Your Honor, I would ask your Honor to—to do what—what 
we anticipated, what Mr. Bouwhuis anticipated, that you run this concurrent with 
the sentence out of Davis County and that is that he serve a year, that he—he be 
given credit for the time that he's served and—and then get into the programs that 
they're contemplating there. 
(R. 63:6-8) (emphasis added). At this point, the court heard from the defendant and then 
asked the prosecutor if he had anything to say. The prosecutor said: 
MR. SAUNDERS: Your Honor, we think the recommendation for prison is 
appropriate. He's been given the change [sic] of probation before and was 
terminated unsuccessfully ... We think that the—the appropriate recommendation 
in this case is prison, your Honor. 
9 
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(R. 63:9-10) (emphases added). 
Two significant points arise out of this discussion. First, defense counsel was 
clearly aware of what the discussions were. He referenced three times that the parties had 
specifically negotiated a resolution in which Mr. Davis would do no more than one year 
in custody—that his time on this case was to be served concurrently with the year he was 
already serving. So it is surprising that when the prosecutor changed his recommendation 
to a prison recommendation that defense counsel failed to object. Clearly he was aware of 
the negotiated agreement—yet when it changed, he remained oddly silent. As the 
Supreme Court said in Ott, there is no conceivable value to having the defendant serve 
time in prison and a failure to object constitutes a clearly objectively deficient 
performance. Secondly, at no point did the State object to Mr. Laker's representation that 
the State's recommendation was for a year. Mr. Laker repeated three times what the 
agreed resolution was. If he were misstating the agreement, then the prosecutor surely 
would have clarified what the true meaning of the agreement was. The prosecution's 
silence, however, in large measure, indicates acceptance of defense counsel's 
representation of the terms of the plea bargain. 
A few similar cases are instructive on this issue. In Gunn v. Ignacio, 263 F.3d 965 
(9n Cir. 2001), the defendant entered a plea to two counts of robbery, which the 
prosecutor agreed to recommend would be served concurrently. He also was to serve 
consecutive sentences on two deadly weapons charges. Id. at 967. The presentence report 
noted the prosecutor's recommendation of concurrent sentencing, but nonetheless 
10 
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recommended consecutive sentences. Id At sentencing, the prosecutor said, "we did not 
oppose running Count V and Count III concurrently. However, your honor, in light of the 
probation officer, the state would concur in the --."Id The court interrupted him and 
reminded him of the plea negotiations. Nonetheless, the prosecutor indicated that he 
supported the presentence report recommendations. Id at 967-68. Gunn's lawyer failed to 
object to the change in recommendation. Id at 968. The State contended on appeal that 
the prosecutor did fulfill his part of the bargain by not opposing a concurrent sentence, 
but still agreeing with the presentence report. Id at 970. The Court of Appeals disagreed, 
relying on Santobello. Specifically, the Court asserted that it must consider "what was 
reasonably understood by (defendant) when he entered his plea of guilty." Id (internal 
quotation and citation omitted). 
Here, the prosecutor promised not to oppose concurrent sentences, but then 
concurred in a presentence report that did oppose concurrent sentences ~ which 
amounts to the prosecutor opposing concurrent sentences. He could have 
concurred in the report in other respects but stated that, pursuant to the plea 
agreement, the state did not oppose concurrent sentences, but he did not make that 
reservation in his total concurrence in the presentence report. 
The difference between concurrent and consecutive in this case is the difference 
between 18 years in prison and 36 years in prison. It was potentially the difference 
between 30 years and 60 years. There can be no doubt that it mattered to Gunn 
when he agreed to the plea bargain. 
Id. at 971. 
Similarly, in this case, the prosecution stated its recommendation, consistent with 
the plea agreement, then concurred in a presentence report which recommended prison. 
11 
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But unlike Gunn, the prosecutor in this case was much more overt: he specifically 
recommended prison, which is an even greater violation. Id. 
In another case the defendant specifically entered a guilty plea on a case with a 
recommendation that he receive a concurrent sentence to his other case. Commonwealth 
v. Parzyck, 668 N.E.2d 1358 (Mass. App. Ct. 1996). At sentencing, the prosecutor 
recommended a consecutive sentence. The defendant, the court said, "was entitled to rely 
on the prosecutor to recommend a concurrent sentence." Id. at 1361. The Court remanded 
the case for specific performance of the plea agreement—hence, a concurrent sentence. 
IcL 
In one case, the defendant entered a plea where the prosecutor recommended 
treatment at an inpatient facility. State v. Spence, 2009 Ohio 6386, 2009 Ohio App. 
LEXIS 5335 (Ohio App. 2009). At sentencing, the prosecutor was silent as to a 
recommendation and defense counsel also failed to object to that silence. The Ohio Court 
of Appeals held that the failure to object constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. 
Clearly, Spence's counsel's performance was deficient. Spence had agreed to plead 
guilty on the promise the State would recommend that he receive a community 
control sanction. Instead, the prosecutor reneged on that agreement and made no 
such recommendation. ... At that point, Spence's counsel had a duty to object to 
the prosecutor's conduct and a duty to insist that the prosecutor carry out the terms 
of the plea agreement or permit his client to withdraw his plea. Counsel, however, 
inexplicably remained silent, breaching his duty to his client. 
Id. at ^[8. The Court reversed the conviction and remanded for resentencing before a 
different trial judge. Id. at J^ 10. 
12 
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In State v. Olmsted, 686 N.W.2d 456 (Wis. App. 2004), the defendant entered a 
plea bargain in which the State agreed to cap its sentencing recommendation at thirty 
years. IcL at ]f 3. At sentencing, the prosecutor made the thirty-year recommendation as 
agreed, but also asked for the second count to be run consecutively. IcL at Tf 5. The 
defendant claimed ineffective assistance of counsel because his attorney did not object to 
the breach. Id. at j^ 8. 
The State concedes that trial counsel did not have a strategy reason for not 
objecting to the prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement. ... We agree with the 
State's concession that the record establishes that trial counsel performed 
deficiently with respect to the breach of the plea agreement. 
The plea agreement required the prosecution to cap its recommendation at thirty 
years. It was an agreement to recommend concurrent sentences. "Where a plea 
agreement undisputedly indicates that a recommendation is to be for concurrent 
sentences, an undisputed recommendation of consecutive sentences that is not 
corrected at the sentencing hearing constitutes a material and substantial breach of 
the plea agreement as a matter of law." Howard, 2001 WI App 137, P19, 246 Wis. 
2d475,630N.W.2d244. 
Olmsted was denied the effective assistance of counsel at sentencing. ... 
Id. at Tflf 9-11. The Court remanded the case for resentencing with a different judge. IcL at 
in. 
The point of law from these cases is that if a defendant enters into a plea 
agreement with a certain understanding as to the prosecutor's recommendation and the 
prosecution changes his recommendation, and if defense counsel fails to object, it 
constitutes ineffective assistance of counsel. 
13 
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Defendant submits, in response to the State's argument that ineffective assistance 
has not been met, that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object to what he knew 
(and stated) to be a clear breach of the State's recommendation upon entry of the plea. 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Failing to Rule on Defendant's Pro Se Motion 
Alleging Ineffective Assistance 
In addition, the trial court, when presented with a motion, has an obligation to rule 
on the issue in front of it. See Utah R. Crim. P. 12. See also Utah R. Crim. P. 24(a) ("The 
court may, upon motion of a party or upon its own initiative, grant a new trial in the 
interest of justice if there is any error or impropriety which had a substantial adverse 
effect upon the rights of a party."). Rule 12 requires the court to determine the motions 
which are presented to it. 
In State v. Vessey, 967 P.2d 960 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), this Court held that the 
trial court's failure to address defendant's pro se ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
constituted per se error. In that case, the defendant moved, pro se, to substitute his 
counsel. Id. at 961. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not conduct any questioning at all, but 
summarily denied defendant's request the same day it was filed. On appeal, the 
state concedes that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to conduct any 
meaningful inquiry into defendant's complaints about his counsel, and we agree. 
Id, at 962. This Court held that 
We prefer a middle ground, agreeing with the majority rule holding that a trial 
court's failure to investigate a defendant's timely substitution request is per se 
14 
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error, but eschewing actual reversal until an actual conflict is established between 
the defendant and counsel of a magnitude requiring substitution of counsel. 
Id. at 962-63. If a defendant files a motion indicating difficulty with counsel, the trial 
court has an obligation to inquire into the matter. 
Furthermore, a trial court's refusal to substitute counsel can only be properly 
reviewed if the trial court conducts a meaningful inquiry. Only the trial court can 
conduct a full evidentiary hearing to explore the substantiality of defendant's 
allegations without reference to subsequent developments and later-acquired 
knowledge. Such an inquiry is not clouded by the possibility that the defendant's 
claim may have been motivated simply by his conviction at trial. The pretrial 
scrutiny not only reduces the likelihood of a post conviction ineffective assistance 
claim, but also creates a record that reviewing courts can rely upon when an 
ineffectiveness issue is raised on appeal. 
Finally, without a per se rule no incentive exists for a trial court to conduct the 
appropriate review in a timely manner. 
IdLat964. 
In Vessey, the court actually denied the defendant's pro se motion. In this case, the 
court took no action on it. When presented with an alleged claim of ineffective assistance, 
the trial court has an obligation to meaningfully explore the matter with the parties to 
determine if a conflict exists between counsel and the defendant. No such inquiry took 
place here and defendant argues that this constitutes per se error. 
15 
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II. DEFENDANT HAS MET THE PLAIN ERROR STANDARD 
Defendant submits the majority of this argument to what has already been said in 
his opening brief and well as many of the arguments made under Part I of this reply brief. 
Nonetheless, some fleshing out of the cases appears to be appropriate. 
In State v. Smit 2004 UT App 222, 95 P.2d 1203, the defendant entered into a 
plea agreement in which the State agreed to recommend a suspended sentence and 
probation. Id. at ]f 2. At the plea agreement, defense counsel stated that "the State is not 
seeking any jail time in sentencing in this matter." Id. at ]j 3. The State did not object to 
this statement. Id. At sentencing, the prosecutor recommended a sentence of three to six 
months in jail. Defense counsel immediately objected and the prosecutor changed his 
recommendation to the agreed-upon sentence. Id. at f^ 4. The defendant filed a motion to 
withdraw his plea, alleging a breach of the plea agreement. Id. at f^ 5. This Court held that 
there was not a breach of the plea agreement "because the State cured its initial breach of 
the plea agreement..." by restating its recommendation. Id, at f^ 21. According to this 
Court, the withdrawl of the plea constitutes the appropriate remedy in these situations and 
this Court has the discretion to either require specific performance of the plea agreement 
or to allow withdrawl of the plea. Id. at ^ 15, 17. 
In State v. Hale, 2005 UT App 305 (memorandum decision), this Court held that a 
prosecutor's breach of the plea agreement constituted plain error. In Hale, the State 
agreed to recommend that if the defendant admitted the allegations of a probation 
16 
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violation, it would not recommend jail time at sentencing. At sentencing, however, the 
prosecutor objected to Adult Probation and Parole's recommendation that the defendant 
be released from custody. This objection, this Court held, constituted a breach of the plea 
agreement under the plain error standard: 
The trial court committed plain error by not recognizing the breach and providing 
the appropriate relief- "specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal 
of the guilty plea." Smit, 2004 UT App 222 at P 17. The trial court was aware of 
the plea agreement at sentencing because its existence was revealed earlier at the 
hearing on Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea — during the cross-
examination of his original counsel — over which the same judge presided. Thus, 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Defendant was also 
prejudiced by the error because the thrust of his argument is that but for the plea 
agreement, which was rendered meaningless by the State's breach and the trial 
court's failure to hold the State to its bargain, he would not have admitted the 
allegations against him. See Dean, 2004 UT 63 at P 22 (observing establishing 
harmful error "generally requires the defendant's assertion that but for' the alleged 
error, he or she would not have pled guilty."). 
The State cites Puckett v. United States2, 129 S. Ct. 1423 (2009) for the 
proposition that defendants are limited to plain error claims in addressing breach of the 
plea agreement if their counsel fails to object. While this is a holding ofPuckett, much of 
its discussion is relevant to the issue at hand. In Puckett, the defendant sought to argue 
that plain error analysis should not apply. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that 
plain error would be a suitable remedy. Id. at 1433. Additionally, the Court discussed the 
government's obligations in plea proceedings: 
In Puckett, the prosecutor entered into a plea agreement and subsequently recommended 
a more severe sentence because the defendant had committed a new offense. Defendant's 
counsel failed to object to the increase. Puckett, 129 S. Ct. at 1426-28. 
17 
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When a defendant agrees to a plea bargain, the Government takes on certain 
obligations. If those obligations are not met, the defendant is entitled to seek a 
remedy, which might in some cases be rescission of the agreement, allowing him 
to take back the consideration he has furnished, i.e., to withdraw his plea. But 
rescission is not the only possible remedy; in Santobello we allowed for a 
resentencing at which the Government would fully comply with the agreement--in 
effect, specific performance of the contract. 404 U.S., at 263, 92 S. Ct. 495, 30 L. 
Ed. 2d 427. In any case, it is entirely clear that a breach does not cause the guilty 
plea, when entered, to have been unknowing or involuntary. It is precisely 
because the plea was knowing and voluntary (and hence valid) that the 
Government is obligated to uphold its side of the bargain. 
Id. at 1430. 
The court explained in a footnote, that a defendant will need to make a showing of 
harm, and that this harm is normally satisfied in a plain error analysis by showing that the 
"outcome", or the sentence, was affected. Id. at 1433, n. 4. 
Defendant was harmed in this case when he entered into what was, in effect, an 
illusory promise by the prosecutor. According to both defendant and his counsel's 
understanding (and construing the plain language of the plea agreement), the parties had 
agreed that the defendant would do a year in jail concurrent with the year he was already 
doing. The State never disputed this fact. It only disputed whether it would recommend 
the exact same sentence. Clearly, the prosecutor could have asked the court to impose 
additional probation conditions or other remedies, but he could not exceed his agreed-
upon recommendation. 
In State v. Copeland 765 P.2d 1266 (Utah 1988), the defendant entered into a plea 
in which the prosecutor promised to recommend treatment at the Utah State Hospital. Id. 
18 
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at 1267. Apparently, the State changed its recommendation to prison after the presentence 
report and Copeland moved to withdraw his plea. Id. at 1267-68. 
There are several problems with the plea bargain entered into by defendant. 
First, it appears either that he misunderstood the promise the State made to him 
regarding its sentencing recommendation or that the promise was illusory. Second, 
and more serious, is the claim thai defendant's understanding of the promise 
caused him to be misled about the sentencing options available to the court and 
therefore the value of the bargain into which he was entering. 
In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 25 L. Ed. 2d 747, 90 S. Ct. 1463 
(1970), the United States Supreme Court held: 
"[A] plea of guilty entered by one fully aware of the direct consequences, 
including the actual value of any commitments made to him by the court, 
prosecutor, or his own counsel, must stand unless induced by threats (or promises 
to discontinue improper harassment), misrepresentation (including unfulfilled or 
unfulfillable promises), or perhaps by promises that are by their nature improper 
as having no proper relationship to the prosecutor's business (e.g. bribes)." 
It is not clear in this case what recommendation the State promised to 
make. According to defense counsel, the State was to "concur in a 
recommendation that Mr. Copeland be committed or sentenced to the Utah State 
Hospital and placed in a sex offenders program in-patient at the hospital." Counsel 
for the State raised no objection to this statement, creating the inference that it was 
correct. ... If the State promised to recommend commitment to the hospital or if 
defendant understood this to be the promise, that promise was illusory. 
It is well established that a prosecutor may not make promises which 
induce a guilty plea and then refuse to keep those promises. 
Id. at 1274-75 (internal citations omitted). In Copeland, the Court held that given the 
confusion of the prosecutor's recommendation, coupled with the fact that the defendant 
could not have been given a hospital sanction, justified allowing the defendant to 
withdraw his plea. Id. at 1276. See also. State v. Norris, 2002 UT App 305, Tj 12, 57 P.3d 
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238 ("We conclude 'it is possible that defendant was genuinely and legitimately confused 
about' the value of these assurances compared with the seriousness of pleading guilty." 
Allowing the defendant to withdraw his plea.) 
If defendants are legitimately confused about the meaning of the terms of a plea 
bargain, due process concerns mandate that the court allow them a remedy. If the 
prosecutor meant in this case that he would recommend a concurrent prison sentence, 
then the defendant and his counsel were clearly confused about this meaning. The 
prosecutor, at no point, objected to defendant's statements that this constituted a 
recommendation for one year in jail. He only stated that the State did not agree to 
recommend the same sentence, only that it would be concurrent. 
The State either promised one of two things: first, it promised to recommend a 
one-year concurrent jail sentence. This was the understanding of both defendant and his 
counsel. Again, at no point did the State contest this representation. If this is the case, 
then the prosecutor clearly and unequivocally breached the agreement when he 
recommended a prison sentence. Secondly, the prosecutor could have been 
recommending a concurrent sentence which included the possibility of prison. However, 
the record does not support that the prosecutor ever intended prison to be part of the deal. 
If that were the case, the plea agreement would more likely have read: "State agrees to 
recommend that the sentence run concurrently to the Davis County jail commitment and 
that if the court were to impose a prison sentence that the defendant could serve time on 
the misdemeanor concurrently at the prison." Or even more simply, "State agrees to a 
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concurrent prison commitment." However, no defendant would take the second option as 
a plea bargain. Mr. Davis was in custody doing a year in jail. He certainly did not want to 
go to prison and would not have entered a plea bargain if the "bargain" were that he serve 
his time concurrently at the prison. Yet, if the State really intended this second option, it 
would have made it much more clear on the record and plea agreement that this were the 
case. A defendant in jail who was committed to the prison would not have the 
opportunity to serve his sentence concurrently at the jail—he would have to serve it at the 
prison. This clearly violates the plea agreement in which the prosecutor recommended 
that the "sentence may run concurrent with Davis Co. case." (R. 19.) A prison sentence 
cannot run concurrently with a jail commitment unless it was served at the prison and 
neither the plea agreement or the statements by counsel support this assertion. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should find that the prosecutor breached the 
plea agreement and remand the case for either withdrawl of the plea, specific 
performance of the agreement or resentencing with a different judge. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2& day of A t A ^ s r ,2010. 
(WNJPT 
SAMUEL P. NEWTON 
Attorney for the Defendant 
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State of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, v. Ricky L. Hale, Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20040363-CA 
COURT OF APPEALS OF UTAH 
2005 UT App 305; 2005 Utah App. LEXIS 304 
June 30, 2005, Filed 
NOTICE: [*1] NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION 
PRIOR HISTORY: Second District, Ogden Department, 021902726. The Honorable Michael Lyon. 
CASE SUMMARY: 
PROCEDURAL POSTURE: The Second District Trial Court, Ogden Department (Utah), following a show cause hearing, 
entered a judgment that sentenced defendant and later denied defendant's motion to withdraw his admission to the allegation that 
hie violated the terms of his plea in abeyance. The sentencing was despite the fact that his plea agreement with the State called for 
mo jail time "come sentencing." Defendant appealed. 
OVERVIEW: Defendant allegedly violated the terms of his plea in abeyance agreement. The State sought to enter into a plea 
igreement. In exchange for him admitting to the allegations that he violated the terms, the State would recommend no jail time 
when it came time for sentencing. Thereafter, the trial court held a show cause hearing. Defendant admitted the allegations. 
Hiowever, the State then asked that defendant be held without bail pending sentencing. The State also objected to his request that 
;he trial court follow the recommendation that he be given credit for time served and released. The trial court agreed with the 
State and sentenced defendant. Defendant then filed a motion to withdraw his admission to the allegations that he violated the 
;erms of his plea in abeyance, which the trial court denied. On appeal, the appellate court found that the trial court committed 
3lain error in not remedying the State's breach of the plea agreement at sentencing when the State objected to the 
•ecommendation that defendant be given credit for time served and released. It also found that defendant's claim that he received 
neffective assistance of counsel at his show cause hearing was meritless. 
3UTCOME: The appellate court vacated defendant's sentence and remanded his case to the trial court to fashion a proper 
•emedy. However, the appellate court also found that defendant's claim that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at his 
;how cause hearing had to fail. 
TORE TERMS: plea agreement, sentencing, ineffective assistance of counsel, cause hearing, withdraw, proper remedy, specific 
)erformance, plain error, ineffective, breached, bail, withdrawal, prejudiced, recommend, abeyance, omission, jail time, guilty 
)lea, exceptional circumstances, failed to meet, recommendation, apprised, verbatim, harmful, prong 
LexisNexis(R) Headnotes 
yiminal Law & Procedure > Preliminary Proceedings > Entry of Pleas > Changes & Withdrawals 
yiminal Law & Procedure > Guilty Pleas > Breach of Plea Agreements 
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agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Plain Error > General Overview 
[HN2] Appellate courts will not consider an issue, including constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless 
the trial court committed plain error or the case involves exceptional circumstances. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > Plain Error > Burdens of Proof 
Evidence > Procedural Considerations > Burdens of Proof > General Overview 
[HN3] To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that: (i) an error exists, (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court, and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Guilty Pleas > Breach of Plea Agreements 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Guilty Pleas > Changes & Withdrawals 
[HN4] The trial court has discretion to choose the proper remedy for breach of a plea agreement, either that of specific 
performance of the pleas agreement by the State or allowing a defendant to withdraw his admission of guilt. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Sentencing 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Tests 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Reviewability > Preservation for Review > Records 
[HN5] Where new counsel represents a defendant on appeal and the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel on direct appeal, a reviewing court reviews those claims as a matter of law. 
Constitutional Law > Bill of Rights > Fundamental Rights > Criminal Process > Assistance of Counsel 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Sentencing 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Tests 
[HN6] To show ineffective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, a defendant must: (i) identify specific 
acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the 
act or omission and under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant. 
Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Sentencing 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Tests 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Appeals > Standards of Review > General Overview 
[HN7] In determining whether counsel's performance is constitutionally deficient, a reviewing court presumes that counsel has 
rendered adequate assistance. 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Pleas 
Criminal Law & Procedure > Counsel > Effective Assistance > Sentencing 
[HN8] An act or omission that might be considered sound trial strategy does not demonstrate inadequacy of counsel. 
COUNSEL: Dee W. Smith, Ogden, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Erin Riley, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
JUDGES: Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge. WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, Gregory K. Orme, Judge. 
OPINION BY: Pamela T. Greenwood 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Before Judges Davis, Greenwood, and Orme. 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant Ricky L. Hale appeals the trial court's denial of his motion to withdraw his admission to allegations that he violated 
the terms of his plea in abeyance agreement. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 
First, Defendant asserts that the State breached its agreement that "in exchange for an admission[,] . . . [the State] would 
recommend no jail time come sentencing. [HM1]" "When a plea agreement is breached by the prosecutor, the proper remedy is 
either specific performance of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea both at the discretion of the trial judge." State 
v. Smit, 2004 UT App 222, P 17, 95 P.3d 1203. Because Defendant raises this issue for the first on appeal, ] we review for plain 
error. See State v. Dean, 2004 UT 63, P 13, 95 P.3d 276 |*2] ( [HN2] "Appellate courts will not consider an issue, including 
constitutional arguments, raised for the first time on appeal unless the trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances.").2 
1 Although Defendant did file a motion to withdraw his admission, the stated reason was ineffective assistance of counsel, not violation of 
the plea agreement. Thus, Defendant raises this argument for the first time on appeal. 
2 Defendant has not alleged "exceptional circumstances." 
[HN3] "To demonstrate plain error, a defendant must establish that (i) an error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to 
the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for 
the appellant."' Id at P 15 (citation omitted). 
Defendant first argues that the State breached the plea agreement at the show cause hearing by asking the trial court, after 
Defendant admitted the allegations, to hold Defendant without bail |*3] pending sentencing. This was not a breach of the plea 
agreement, however, because the State did not agree to recommend that Defendant be released on bail pending sentencing; 
rather, the State agreed only to recommend no jail time "come sentencing." Moreover, even if this were a breach of the plea 
agreement, this error could not have been obvious to the trial court at this time because the plea agreement was never put on the 
record or otherwise made known to the trial court until after the show cause hearing — at the hearing on Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his admission. 
Alternatively, Defendant argues that the State breached the plea agreement at sentencing by objecting to Defendant's request that 
the trial court follow Adult Probation & Parole's recommendation that Defendant be given credit for time served and released. 
We agree. 
The trial court committed plain error by not recognizing the breach and providing the appropriate relief-- "specific performance 
of the plea agreement or withdrawal of the guilty plea." Smit, 2004 UT App 222 at P 17. The trial court was aware of the plea 
agreement at sentencing because its existence was revealed earlier at the hearing [*4] on Defendant's motion to withdraw his 
plea — during the cross-examination of his original counsel -- over which the same judge presided. Thus, the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court.3 Defendant was also prejudiced by the error because the thrust of his argument is that but for the 
slea agreement, which was rendered meaningless by the State's breach and the trial court's failure to hold the State to its bargain, 
le would not have admitted the allegations against him. See Dean, 2004 UT 63 at P 22 (observing establishing harmful error 
'generally requires the defendant's assertion that but for' the alleged error, he or she would not have pled guilty."). 
3 Interestingly, Defendant does not assert ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal based on his counsel's failure to mention or attempt to 
enforce the plea agreement at sentencing. 
\ccordingly, we remand to the trial court to enter the proper remedy for the State's breach of the plea agreement by exercising its 
liscretion [*5] to determine whether the circumstances require either specific performance of the olea agreement bv the State 4 or 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court has discretion to choose the proper remedy for breach of the plea agreement). 
4 We note that if the trial court determines that specific performance of the plea agreement is the proper remedy for the State's breach, the 
State's recommendation and Defendant's resentencing should take place before a different judge. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 
263, 30 L. Ed. 2d 427, 92 S. Ct. 495 (1971) (indicating where "the circumstances of th[e] case require only that there be specific performance 
of the agreement on the plea, . . . [the defendant] should be resentenced by a different judge."). 
5 Although we reverse on this issue, we note that the trial court made every attempt to permit Defendant to introduce evidence that he 
claimed would prove that he complied with the plea in abeyance agreement. For example, the trial court permitted Defendant to post bail, 
provided he could make bail on other unrelated charges, to retrieve the evidence from his home in Reno, Nevada. On another occasion, after 
denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his admission, the trial court scheduled sentencing to provide Defendant another opportunity to 
obtain the exculpatory evidence. Nonetheless, Defendant never produced the evidence. 
[*6] Defendant also asserts that he received ineffective assistance of counsel at the show cause hearing. [HN5] Where new 
counsel represents a defendant on appeal and "the record is adequate to review his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel" on 
direct appeal, we review "those claims as a matter of law." See State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). 
[HN6] To show ineffective assistance of counsel, as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment, "a defendant must (i) identify specific 
acts or omissions by counsel that fall below the standard of reasonable professional assistance when considered at the time of the 
act or omission and under all the attendant circumstances, and (ii) demonstrate that counsel's error prejudiced the defendant." 
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1225 (Utah 1993) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 690-91, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674, 104 
S. Ct. 2052 (1984)). "Failure to satisfy either prong will result in our concluding that counsel's behavior was not ineffective." 
State v. Diaz, 2002 UT App 288, P 38, 55 P.3d 1131. 
Defendant first argues that his counsel at the show cause hearing was ineffective because he failed to [*7] adequately discuss the 
allegations with Defendant. We disagree. Defendant's counsel generally discussed the allegations with Defendant, apprised 
Defendant of the substance of the allegations, and discussed what strategy to pursue. This assistance was adequate. Although 
Defendant's counsel did not read each accusation verbatim to Defendant, Defendant has not cited any authority requiring a 
verbatim reading, and thus, has failed to meet his burden. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1225 ([HN7] "In determining whether counsel's 
performance is constitutionally deficient, we presume that counsel has rendered adequate assistance."). Moreover, Defendant was 
not prejudiced by the discussion because Defendant avowed in his colloquy with the trial court, before his admission, that he was 
familiar with the allegations. 
Defendant next asserts that his counsel was ineffective because he did not view a violation of the plea in abeyance agreement as 
serious. However, even if this were true, given the number of more serious charges then pending against Defendant, this attitude 
was appropriate. Focusing Defendant's attention on the more serious charges and having Defendant admit responsibility, |*8J in 
an attempt to receive more lenient treatment, was a valid strategy choice. Cf. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 699 (viewing counsel's 
decision to rely "as fully as possible on [the defendant's] acceptance of responsibility for his crimes" as a valid strategy choice); 
see also Dunn 850 P.2d at 1225 (noting [HN8] an act or omission that "might be considered sound trial strategy" does not 
demonstrate inadequacy of counsel). Thus, Defendant has failed to meet the first prong of the test, and therefore, this claim fails. 
Defendant's final assertion is that his counsel was ineffective because he failed to put the plea agreement on the record at the 
show cause hearing. This argument is without merit. Even assuming that this failure was outside the range of professional 
competence, it did not prejudice Defendant because the trial court was apprised of the plea agreement, before sentencing, at the 
hearing on Defendant's motion to withdraw his plea. Thus, because the plea agreement was effectively put on the record before 
the trial court sentenced Defendant, the failure of Defendant's attorney to memorialize it at the show cause hearing did not 
prejudice Defendant. 
[*9] Accordingly, Defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel fail. However, we vacate Defendant's sentence and 
remand this case for the trial court to fashion a proper remedy because the trial court committed plain error by not curing the 
State's breach of the plea agreement. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
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WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
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